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Summary 
In the context of the internet and the World Wide Web, the position of links – such as 
hyperlinks and embedded links – is essential. Linking facilitates web navigation and 
information retrieval to a point where it is difficult to conceive of a web without them. 
The copyright holder’s right of communication of the work to the public is an exclusive, 
economic right. Each new act of communication of that work to a public is subject to 
the rightholder’s authorisation. In the absence of such authorisation, a public 
communication of that work is deemed intervening. However, case law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has established that an unauthorised public 
communication of a work, in order to be considered intervening, sometimes also has to 
be directed to a new public – a public not taken into account by the rightholders when 
they authorised the initial public communication of the work. 
Recent case law of the CJEU has established that linking to copyright protected works 
constitutes an ‘act of communication’ of the works that the link refers to. However, the 
same case law also establishes that such links are only intervening if they communicate 
the work to a new public. Thus, if the work is ‘freely accessible’ on the website where it 
was initially communicated, a link to that work does not communicate it to a new 
public. 
In its quest to strike a fair balance between the rights and interests of rightholders and 
users, it appears that the CJEU – so far – has respected the significant position of links 
in the context of web navigation. Nevertheless, it also seems that the transfer of the 
‘new public criterion’ to internet communications has created new and particularly 
complicated implications, potentially leading to undesired commercial exploitations of 
protected works in the online environment contrary to the interests of rightholders. 
There may be an argument that this neglects the goal of ensuring a high level of 
protection for rightholders. Moreover, unanswered questions remain regarding what 
content is to be considered ‘freely accessible’ as well as the status of links that refer the 
user to unauthorised versions of a work. As the answers to these questions may 
unreasonably prejudice the interests of both users and rightholders, it is possibly too 
early to claim that the CJEU has achieved its goal of striking a fair balance. 
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Sammanfattning 
Internetlänkar – såsom hyperlänkar och inlinelänkar – är centrala inom internet och 
World Wide Web (”nätet”). Länkning förenklar navigering på nätet och 
informationssökning till den grad att det är svårt att föreställa sig ett nät utan dem.  
Upphovsrättsinnehavarens rätt till överföring av verket till allmänheten är en exklusiv, 
ekonomisk rättighet. Varje ny överföring av verket till en publik måste tillåtas av 
rättsinnehavaren. I brist på sådan tillåtelse föreligger en olovlig överföring till 
allmänheten. Praxis från Europeiska unionens domstol (EUD) har emellertid fastställt 
att en överföring till allmänheten, för att anses vara olovlig, också måste vara riktad till 
en ny publik, det vill säga en publik som verkets upphovsmän inte beaktade när de 
lämnade sitt tillstånd till den ursprungliga överföringen av verket till allmänheten. 
Vidare har praxis från EUD fastställt att länkning till upphovsrättsskyddade verk utgör 
en ”överföring” av verken som länken hänvisar till. Samma praxis slår emellertid även 
fast att sådana länkar endast är olovliga om de överför verken till en ny publik. Om 
verket är ”fritt tillgängligt” på den webbplats där det ursprungligen lades upp, överför 
därför inte en länk verket till en ”ny” publik.  
Det framstår som att EUD, i sin strävan att upprätthålla en skälig avvägning mellan 
rättigheter och intressen hos rättsinnehavare och användare, hittills har tagit hänsyn till 
länkars betydelsefulla roll i samband med navigering på nätet. Det förefaller dock även 
som att övergången av konceptet om en ”ny publik” till internetöverföringar har gett 
upphov till nya och särskilt komplicerade konsekvenser. Dessa kan potentiellt leda till 
oönskade kommersiella utnyttjanden av skyddade verk på nätet, i strid med 
rättsinnehavares intressen. Det kan hävdas att detta inte tar hänsyn till målet att skapa en 
hög skyddsnivå för rättsinnehavare. Dessutom kvarstår frågor gällande betydelsen av 
”fritt tillgängligt” material samt rättsläget kring länkar som hänvisar användaren till en 
otillåten version av ett verk. Eftersom svaren på dessa frågor kan leda till oskäliga 
resultat för både användare och rättsinnehavare, är det förmodligen för tidigt att 
fastställa att EUD har upprätthållit en skälig avvägning mellan rättsinnehavare och 
användare. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
This essay contains sixteen links. Arguably, the World Wide Web contains billions. 
Upon following (i.e. clicking) those links, many will refer the user to websites 
containing copyright protected content. By allowing for easy and user-friendly web 
navigation, the position of linking as a core function of the web cannot be overstated. 
Consequently, this essay deals with the legal regulation of links in the EU.  More 
precisely, it will answer the question whether or not links can intervene in a copyright 
holder’s public communication right. Undoubtedly, the answer is ‘yes’.  A link can be 
an act of communication in itself. As a link ‘makes available’ a copyright protected 
work that it refers to, that work is being communicated. However, not every 
unauthorised ‘re-communication’ intervenes in the author’s exclusive public 
communication right. Under some circumstances, the CJEU has established that an 
unauthorised re-communication is only intervening when it is also directed to a new 
public.  
The public communication right is an exclusive, economic right. Every act of 
communication of the work to a (new) public requires the copyright holder’s 
authorisation. Hence, while the regulation of links is an important part of this essay, it is 
mainly an essay about the public communication right and, in particular, what will 
hereinafter be referred to as the ‘new public criterion’. Indeed, as for links in relation to 
the public communication right, this appears to be the decisive criterion. 
1.2 Thesis 
The ultimate purpose of this essay is to analyse the new public criterion in relation to 
the public communication right, with a specific focus on linking. This requires 
investigation of both the technical and legal context of links, as well as the legal context 
of the new public criterion.  
The notion of new public was introduced in a CJEU case concerning ordinary television 
broadcasts, and it is not obvious that the criterion’s subsequent transition to the online 
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environment was fully taken into account, or that the transfer has been smooth. While 
aiming for a high level of protection for copyright holders, the InfoSoc Directive
1
 also 
strives to strike a fair balance between the interests of rightholders and users. There may 
be an argument that the application of the new public criterion does not always achieve 
this. Indeed, there may even be an argument that the new public criterion as such is 
unfounded. 
Consequently, the following questions will be answered: 
 How are linking techniques regulated through the public communication right? 
 What is the basis of the new public criterion, and when is it applied? 
 What specific issues have arisen as a result of the transfer of the new public 
criterion to internet communications such as links? 
 Does the new public criterion strike a fair balance between users and 
rightholders in relation to linking activities? 
The first two questions are generally descriptive, but provide a necessary groundwork 
for the analysis. However, the ultimate discussion will focus on the final two questions.  
1.3 Delimitations  
This essay concerns certain aspects of the regulation of linking practices, in the EU, 
from a copyright perspective. There are other methods of regulating links. For example, 
the much debated right to be forgotten ruling
2
 regulates, inter alia, linking practices for 
privacy concerns. This is beyond the scope of this essay. 
There is also a sui generis database protection right that has been the subject of scrutiny 
in relation to linking activities that extract or re-utilise the contents of a database.
3
 This 
essay does not seek to address that particular issue. 
Even within the area of linking in relation to the public communication right, certain 
delimitations are necessary. Much of the debate has revolved around whether or not a 
link can constitute an ‘act of communication’ in the first place. This is mainly a result of 
                                                 
1
 Directive 2001/29 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation 
of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society.                                                                                                                         
2
 Case C-131/12 Google v González. 
3
 Case C-202/12 Innoweb. 
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disagreements regarding whether an ‘act of communication’ requires actual 
transmission of the work. In essence, a link does not transmit the work that it refers to. 
However, in the EU, it is now established that linking to a copyright protected work is 
an act of communication. While this is controversial, it will not be discussed in any 
great lengths, but generally accepted as a fact.
4
 Instead, the focus is on the concept of 
public. 
Furthermore, the rightholder’s public communication right is separate from his right of 
reproduction. This essay does not concern itself with links in relation to any potential 
reproduction of the content. Neither will there be any specific discussion about the 
provision of links resulting in indirect liability, such as contributory or vicarious 
liability to infringement.  
Finally, as far as possible, the discussion aims to cover all different types of links. The 
CJEU has adopted a neutral approach to different types of links (at least for manually 
activated links), which means including so called hyperlinks and inline links, as well as 
framing. Explanations will be provided below. 
1.4 Method and material 
This essay explains and interprets EU legislation. It does not purport to interpret 
international treaties. Oftentimes, EU directives on copyright are based on international 
treaties, and should be studied in the light of those treaties. However, while studying 
international treaties is therefore an inescapable part of this essay, this is not a result of 
any overarching ‘international legal method’. Rather, it is a result of an EU legal 
principle – that EU directives should be seen in the light of any underlying international 
treaties. Consequently, it is not incorrect to claim that this essay applies a ‘European 
legal method’. For the purposes of this essay, EU directives and other international 
treaties have only provided limited guidance. Instead, the discussion is built on the 
preliminary rulings of the CJEU. As for Member States’ domestic legal regulation of 
links, the few cases that are mentioned only serve to highlight some general approaches 
to the regulation of links prior to recent CJEU case law. 
                                                 
4
 See section 4.3.2 for a brief discussion. 
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In many respects, CJEU rulings on linking have been frustratingly ambiguous. Hence, 
there have been significant differences of opinion between commentators on many 
issues. Therefore, this essay is also an effort to understand and highlight different 
issues, viewpoints and solutions. Considering the many remaining uncertainties, the 
author’s own opinions will be provided. However, the aim has been to maintain a 
neutral and objective approach towards unanswered questions. While respecting the 
need for protection of intellectual property rights, one must also consider the interests of 
users.  
There is also a technical aspect. It will be made apparent that the applicability of the 
new public criterion depends on the technical means of communication. Furthermore, a 
basic understanding of different types of links makes the essay easier to understand. 
Because of this, the legal discussion is preceded by a descriptive technical part. For 
these technical descriptions, Wikipedia has partly been used. Certain readers might find 
this provoking. However, while unsuitable for legal guidance, it is submitted that 
Wikipedia can often be an adequate source for finding factual information. Still, it is 
also accepted that one must be cautious. Therefore, as far as possible, alternative 
sources have been used. 
Regarding the terminology, some clarifications should be provided. In general, the term 
link is used, meaning all types of manually activated links. This is appropriate, as recent 
developments indicate neutrality towards different types of links, but perhaps not 
automatically activated links. Also, the authorised communication of a work is referred 
to as the ‘original communication’ or ‘initial communication’. An unauthorised 
communication of that work is referred to as a ‘re-communication’ or ‘retransmission’. 
Finally, I would like to bring particular attention to Johan Axham’s ‘Internet Linking 
and the Notion of “New Public”’ and Alexander Tsoutsanis’ ‘Why copyright and 
linking can tango’, as well as several interesting linking-related blog posts in The IPKat, 
that have been particularly helpful. 
1.5 Outline 
There are five chapters. Chapter 2 puts linking in its technical context, and presents the 
potential implications of links. Chapter 3 presents the legal regulation of links, which 
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includes suggested approaches as well as the approach eventually adopted by the CJEU. 
It will be made apparent that the decisive criterion is the occurrence of a new public. 
Consequently, in chapter 4, the new public criterion is put into its legal context and 
fully explored. Finally, chapter 5 discusses and analyses the new public criterion and its 
suitability in relation to links and internet communications. The author’s own opinions 
and conclusions will partly be provided throughout the essay. However, these 
conclusions will converge into a final discussion in chapter 5.  
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2 ‘Linking’ and its implications 
2.1 Background 
To be able to discuss the regulation of links, it is necessary to understand the 
fundamentals of the underlying technology. Later in this essay, it will be made apparent 
that the application of the new public criterion is sensitive to the technical means of a 
communication, as well as to any access restrictions put on the initial communication. 
Also, different types of links may entail different potential implications. The following 
technical explanations are therefore motivated. 
2.2 Linking in a technical context 
2.2.1 The internet and the web 
The internet is ‘a global system of interconnected computer networks that use the 
standard internet protocol suite (TCP/IP) to link several billion devices worldwide. It is 
an international network of networks’.5 In turn, the internet allows the use of the World 
Wide Web (WWW, w3, or the ‘web’), an information retrieval service that offers access 
to interlinked documents that are connected by hypertext or hyperlinks. Stemming from 
the late 1980s, and popularised in the following decade, the web allows users, through 
web browsers (such as Internet Explorer), to view and navigate between documents 
(such as websites) easily.
6
  
Typically, web navigation (i.e. ‘surfing the web’) is done by following various kinds of 
links. Consequently, the position of links – in the context of the internet and the web – 
is central. Linking constitutes a cornerstone of the web, making its navigation simple 
and fast.
7
 The possibility of providing links has even been considered a way of 
exercising the right of free speech.
8
 
                                                 
5
 Wikipedia: Internet (e-source). 
6
 Encyclopaedia Britannica: World Wide Web (WWW) (e-source). 
7
 Westman, p. 800. 
8
 Bently et al, p. 1; Berners-Lee (2) (e-source). 
13 
 
2.2.2 Different types of links 
Links are actions within HTML, the most common language for writing websites.
9
 
Technically, a link is a reference to the location of data that can be easily followed. 
Generally, this is done by clicking the link, but there are also links that are activated 
automatically.
10
  
There are generally considered to be two main branches of links, hyperlinks and inline 
links.
11
 The most basic hyperlink refers the user to the homepage of a website upon 
clicking the link. While there is no consensus on the naming of these types of links, I 
will refer to them as a ‘simple links’.12 Here is an example: www.jur.lu.se. A variant of 
the simple link, which is sometimes treated separately, takes the user to a specific 
destination on a website containing copyright protected content such as a specific 
article, video or sound recording. It may also refer the user straight to a pop-up window, 
typically giving him the options to ‘Run or Save’ the file. These links are generally 
called ‘deep links’.13 Here is an example: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet. While 
deep links are oftentimes considered different from simple links, the technical process is 
similar. Also, the homepage of a website will often contain copyright protected content, 
which can make the difference between simple links and deep links negligible.
14
  
Inline linking, alternatively embedded linking, refers to the situation where one website 
(the linking website) uses a linked object from another website, such as an image or a 
video clip. That content then appears on the linking website, but without any permanent 
reproduction taking place. The URL (web address) of the linking website, instead of the 
address of the targeted website, is still shown in the address field at the top of the 
browser.
15
 
In relation to this, the act of framing can be considered separately. When one clicks a 
framed link, the targeted website is shown ‘within frames’, but still incorporated in the 
same window as the linking website. Similarly to inline links, this may cause confusion 
                                                 
9
 Westman, p. 803. 
10
 Wikipedia: Hyperlink (e-source). 
11
 Westman, p. 803; ALAI Report (1), p. 153. 
12
 ALAI Report (1), p. 153. Alternative terms are ‘normal links’ and ‘reference links’. 
13
 Rosén, p. 163; ALAI Report (1), p. 153. 
14
 Westman, p. 808. 
15
 Honkasalo, p. 259; Tsoutsanis, p. 497. 
14 
 
regarding the origin of the linked content, especially since it is the URL of the linking 
website that is typically shown in the address field.
16
  
Importantly, links do not permanently reproduce the source content – the content on the 
other end of the link.
17
 Both hyperlinks and inline links are dependent on the availability 
and accessibility of the source content. If that content is removed, or access restricted in 
any way, a link to it will normally fail. 
2.2.3 Access restrictions  
Since CJEU case law has suggested that links that circumvent restrictions may receive 
separate treatment, it is relevant to mention some ways of restricting linking techniques 
and access to content in general. 
Common access restrictions include paywalls, in conjunction with log-in requirements, 
as well as territorial restrictions (i.e. limiting access to the users in a country or region). 
Normally, such restrictions should hinder undesired linking techniques. However, this 
may not always be effective, as some linking practices may circumvent access 
restrictions.
18
  
Finally, simple contractual restrictions can occur, e.g. requiring the user to agree to the 
website’s terms of use in order to proceed. While such contractual restrictions do not 
restrict access in any technical way, they may still be relevant in determining which 
public the rightholder took into account when authorising a communication. There may 
therefore be an argument that contractual restrictions as such can affect whether or not 
the content is to be considered ‘freely accessible’. This will be further explored at a later 
stage. 
2.3 Implications of links 
Despite the essential position of links to ensure the normal functionality of the web, 
they may also entail potentially negative implications. The reasons for limiting linking 
techniques may not be obvious to the reader, and it is therefore necessary to list a few. 
                                                 
16
 Berners-Lee (1) (e-source); Garrote, p. 185. 
17
 Garrote, p. 185: Much internet usage, such as the act of browsing websites, does create temporary 
copies in the computer’s RAM (random-access memory). This potential issue is not covered in this essay.  
18
 See still pending Case C-279/13 C More Entertainment, where unauthorised links where provided to 
live streams of ice hockey matches, circumventing a paywall. 
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Initially, the copyright holder will object to links leading to illicit content – i.e. content 
that was uploaded without the copyright holder’s authorisation in the first place. Of 
course, removing the link will not remove the unauthorised reproduction. Nevertheless, 
removing the link can be more effective, as it hides the content from the public eye.
19
 
This may be particularly relevant in the case of so called ‘link farms’ and aggregator 
sites – websites providing a multitude of links to illicit content such as torrent files to 
pirated content or links to live streams of sports matches, but not providing the actual 
works. Furthermore, even if such websites link to legally uploaded content, the 
behaviour may generate undue profits for the owner of the linking website, upsetting the 
rightholder.
20
 
Another commonly stated argument, relating in particular to deep links, inline links and 
framing, is that such practices circumvent homepages, often the main place for 
advertisements – the main source of income for many websites.21 Conversely, it can be 
argued that it is the operator’s own responsibility to place the advertisements not only 
on the homepage, but all across the website or at its most popular pages.
22
 Still, website 
operators preferring to limit advertisements to the homepage – e.g. for layout reasons – 
may feel they have a valid interest in restricting links that evade it.  
In relation to this, another potential conflict is that the origin of the content subject to 
the link can be uncertain for the end user. In many cases, this will be a non-issue as the 
origin of the content is indisputable, such as when a deep link takes the user to an article 
on a newspaper’s website with its logo and the author’s name clearly displayed. 
However, linking techniques also create situations where the origin of the content may 
be ambiguous. Inline links can selectively embed the targeted content on the linking 
website, making its origin uncertain, and deep links may take the user straight to a ‘Run 
or Save’ pop-up window, causing similar confusion. In these cases, the end user may be 
unaware of, and uninterested in, the origin of the content, and may believe it stems from 
the linking website. The rightholder may then prefer links that take the user directly to 
the website’s homepage.   
                                                 
19
 This is comparable to the reasoning in the right to be forgotten judgement (Case C-131/12 Google v 
González). 
20
 Tsoutsanis, p. 508. 
21
 Bainbridge, p. 282; Ebersöhn, p. 73. 
22
 Bainbridge, p. 285. 
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Consequently, it is not difficult to envisage situations where rightholders will object to 
linking techniques. On the other hand, rightholders will often encourage links to their 
websites, as they also constitute a way of attracting desired traffic. Therefore, too strict 
of an approach towards linking would not necessarily be in the interest of every 
rightholder.  
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3 The regulation of linking 
3.1 Background 
Until recently, there was no harmonised regulation of linking in the EU. This is perhaps 
surprising considering the substantial discussion regarding the legal status of links since 
the beginning of the 2000s, often concerning whether or not linking can amount to 
communication, or making available, to the public within Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc 
Directive. The concepts of ‘communication’ and ‘making available’ to the public will 
be further elaborated in Chapter 4 of this essay. However, at this stage, it is already 
useful to present Article 3 in its entirety, which reads as follows: 
 ‘Article 3 
Right of communication to the public of works and right of making available 
to the public other subject-matter 
1. Member States shall provide authors with the exclusive right to authorise or 
prohibit any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless 
means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a 
way that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them. 
2. Member States shall provide for the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit 
the making available to the public, by wire or wireless means, in such a way 
that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them: 
(a) for performers, of fixations of their performances; 
(b) for phonogram producers, of their phonograms; 
(c) for the producers of the first fixation of films, of the original and 
copies of their films; 
(d) for broadcasting organisations, of fixations of their broadcasts, 
whether these broadcasts are transmitted by wire or over the air, 
including by cable or satellite. 
18 
 
3. The rights referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be exhausted by any act 
of communication to the public or making available to the public as set out in 
this Article.’23 
Consequently, the debate has created two camps. On one hand, there are those who 
argue that links are not relevant acts from a copyright perspective and that providing 
links should not entail direct liability. The proponents of this view sometimes compare 
links with footnotes, simply being references to the location of content regardless of that 
content being illicit or not. Furthermore, is has been argued that communication 
requires actual transmission of a work. As a link does not transmit a work, it is not an 
act of communication.
24
  
On the other hand, it has been contended that transmission is not a requirement for 
establishing an act of communication. Proponents of this view have pointed out that the 
concept of ‘making available’ expands the notion of ‘communication’ so that it does not 
require actual transmission of a work, but simply requires that a work is offered and, at 
least indirectly, made available through a link. Hence, from this viewpoint, it is possible 
to consider linking as an act of communication within Article 3(1).
25
 It has also been 
pointed out that links are often more than just ‘footnotes’, but can operate as ‘shortcuts’ 
to viewing content. For example, embedded links effectively use a linked object as a 
part of a document.
26
 
There have been a multitude of domestic cases in the Member States of the EU, such as 
Shetland Times v Wills
27
 (Scotland) Paperboy
28
 (Germany), napster.no
29
 (Norway), and 
MP3
30
 (Sweden). The outcomes have varied. For example, in Shetland Times v Wills, 
stemming from 1996, an interim interdict was granted on behalf of The Shetland Times 
when a competing newspaper, The Shetland News, created a website that provided deep 
links, in conjunction with headlines, to articles of The Shetland Times. However, the 
                                                 
23
 Italics added. 
24
 See for example Bently et al, p. 2-3. Note that the authors (European Copyright Society) remained open 
to indirect liability through providing hyperlinks to illicit content. 
25
 See for example ALAI Report (1); Tsoutsanis, for comprehensive discussions.  
26
 Tsoutsanis, p. 497. 
27
 Shetland Times v. Jonathan Wills and Zetnews, interim interdict, October 24, 1996, Court of Session, 
Edinburgh [1997] FSR 604. 
28
 BGH I ZR 259/00, Urteil vom 2003-07-17.   
29
 Høyesteretts dom 2005-01-27, HR-2005-133-A-Rt 2005-41.                                        
30
 NJA 2000 s. 292. 
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case was finally settled out of court.
31
 In Paperboy, the German Bundesgerichtshof 
adopted a more permissive approach towards hyperlinks, comparing them with 
footnotes – and not relevant acts in copyright law.32 In napster.no, the Norwegian 
Høyesterett was similarly sceptical of regarding links as communications to the public 
(though not completely excluding the possibility).
33
 Conversely, in MP3, Sweden’s 
Högsta Domstolen ruled the provision of deep links as being a communication to the 
public.
34
 
Considering the different outcomes in domestic cases, the lack of harmonisation in 
Europe may be regarded as unfortunate, especially bearing in mind the inherent cross-
border nature of internet communications. This has led to extensive discussion and 
differences of opinion regarding the legal status of links. Through Article 3(1) of the 
2001 InfoSoc Directive, there has been legislation that could potentially clarify the issue 
of links. Nevertheless, it was not until 2014 that a harmonised legal status of links began 
to crystallise through several referrals of cases to the CJEU. 
Following lengthy discussion, several CJEU cases relating to linking activities suddenly 
emerged, starting with Innoweb,
35
 then Svensson
36
 – the first CJEU case concerning 
clickable links in relation to the public communication right, and copyright protected 
content in general. This was followed by the Court’s order in BestWater,37 while 
another reference, C More Entertainment,
38
 is in the pipelines.  
3.2 Case C-466/12 Svensson 
3.2.1 Background 
In a much-anticipated judgement, Nils Svensson and Others v Retriever Sverige, the 
CJEU responded to some questions regarding the legal status of links, while also raising 
new ones. Remarkably, the judgment was not preceded by an Opinion of the Advocate-
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General, a surprise as this step can primarily be ignored only when the case does not 
concern a new point of law.
39
 In fact, Svensson was one of several recent copyright 
related cases where the Advocate-General was not consulted, the reason remaining 
uncertain.
40
 Considering the significant differences of opinion regarding the legal 
regulation of linking, both before and after the judgement was handed down, foregoing 
the Advocate-General’s opinion is very surprising. 
In the case, Swedish news aggregator website ‘Retriever’ was providing users with 
clickable hyperlinks to news articles (i.e. deep links) uploaded on other websites. 
Amongst the linked content were articles on the Göteborgs-Posten website, where the 
articles were indisputably freely accessible and uploaded with the rightholders’ 
authorisation. The applicants, rightholders Nils Svensson and fellow journalists, 
contended that the linking activities to their articles constituted intervening 
communications to the public as it amounted to ‘making available’ of the copyrighted 
works as expressed in Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive.  
Conversely, Retriever contended that the provision of links to the works already 
communicated to the public on the original website did not constitute an act liable to 
infringe copyright as linking, in any case, did not amount to transmission as allegedly 
required by Article 3(1). In other words, Retriever did not consider there to be an 
intervention in the authors’ exclusive public communication right. 
Consequently, the main question referred was, in essence, whether the unauthorised 
provision of clickable links to protected works constitutes an intervening act of 
communication to the public within Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive. 
3.2.2 Judgement and comments 
Initially, the Court clarified that the concept of communication to the public involves 
two cumulative steps. Firstly, an ‘act of communication’ must be established and, 
secondly, that communication must be made to a ‘public’.41 
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As for there being an act of communication, it was stated that this must be construed 
broadly in order to ensure a high level of protection for copyright holders. Without 
further ado, the Court then concluded that since it is sufficient that a work is made 
available so that the public may access it, regardless of whether they actually do so, 
providing clickable links must be considered ‘making available’ and, therefore, also an 
‘act of communication’ within Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive as such links afford 
users direct access to works.
42
 Consequently, it was established that links to copyright 
protected works do constitute ‘acts of communications’, and that a communication does 
not require actual transmission. Still, the lack of an elaborated discussion from the Court 
supporting this crucial conclusion is truly remarkable.
43
 
Less controversially, it was also held that Retriever’s provision of links meant that the 
works were communicated to a ‘public’, a concept that refers to ‘an indeterminate 
number of potential recipients and implies, moreover, a fairly large number of 
persons’.44  
However, the Court further held, with reference to settled case-law, that since 
Retriever’s re-communication used the same technical means as the initial 
communication of the works, it must also be directed to a new public, meaning a public 
that was not taken into account by the copyright holders when the initial communication 
was authorised.
45
 Consequently, as the articles had been made freely accessible without 
restrictions on the Göteborgs-Posten website, the public that had been taken into 
account by that initial communication was considered to consist of all potential visitors. 
Therefore, when Retriever provided links to the articles, it was a communication to a 
public, but not to a new public.
46
 The wording of the CJEU fuels speculation that the 
new public criterion is only applied when the re-communication uses the same technical 
means as the initial communication. Also, it appears that different linking techniques 
should be considered as using the same technical means – ‘the internet’. Hence, it may 
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be expected that a new public criterion will always be used when both the initial 
communication and the re-communication are made through internet technology.   
Furthermore, though not being practiced by Retriever in the case, it was held as 
irrelevant that the clicking of a link presents the work in such a way as to give the 
impression that it is appearing on the site on which that link is found. Even in such 
cases, there is no ‘new public’, as long as there is an authorised and freely accessible 
version of the work on another website.
47
 This seems to mean that inline linking, such 
as the embedding of content, and framing receive no separate treatment from 
hyperlinks. 
Finally, however, when a link allows users to circumvent restrictions placed on the 
initial communication, that link must be considered communicating the work to a ‘new 
public’. Particularly, this should be the case when the work is no longer available on the 
original website where it was lawfully uploaded, or when access has subsequently been 
restricted on that website while being available on a another website without 
authorisation.
48
  
This final statement causes confusion. If the work is no longer available on the original 
website, or access has been properly restricted there, any link to it will typically fail. In 
the efforts to make sense of this paragraph, some have concluded that even linking to 
unauthorised third-party reproductions of a work is permissible, but only as long as an 
authorised version of that work is also freely accessible on the original website as 
well.
49
 After all, if one strictly applies the new public criterion, a link to an unauthorised 
third-party version of a work does not communicate the work to a new public, as long as 
the initial communication is also freely accessible on another webpage.
50
 However, it 
should be noted that others interpreted the passage as meaning that linking to 
unauthorised or restricted communications of a work is not permissible.
51
  
It also remains uncertain what is to be considered ‘restrictions’. Access limitations such 
as paywalls and territorial restrictions are likely to fall within the concept. Whether 
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contractual restrictions are covered, such as agreeing to terms of use on a website’s 
homepage, was not clarified by the Court’s judgement.52  
Consequently, the Court’s position, in particular regarding its position on the legality of 
the source content, and what constitutes ‘freely accessible’ content, remained somewhat 
ambiguous. Regarding this, the case of BestWater provided an opportunity to make 
further clarifications. 
3.3 Case C-348/13 BestWater  
3.3.1 Background 
On 21 October 2014 the CJEU handed down its decision in BestWater, a case that had 
been left pending awaiting a final decision in Svensson. Notably, the BestWater decision 
was handed down through a ‘reasoned order’ in accordance with Article 99 of the 
Court’s Rules of Procedure. According to that provision, this can only be done when the 
referred question is identical to questions in previous rulings, when the reply can clearly 
be deduced from previous case law, or otherwise where the answer ‘admits of no 
reasonable doubt’.53 Consequently, the Court must have considered its judgement in 
Svensson as an established precedent in determining the public communication right in 
relation to linking practices. 
However, the facts in BestWater differed from Svensson. In the case, the copyright 
holder, BestWater International, had uploaded an authorised and freely accessible 
promotional video on its own website. Subsequently, according to BestWater, a third-
party posted an unauthorised reproduction of the same video on YouTube.
54
 However, 
neither the origin, nor the illegality of the YouTube version were established as facts. 
Later, a competitor to BestWater provided a link to the allegedly unauthorised YouTube 
version by embedding the video on its own website.
55
 The question referred to the CJEU 
was: 
‘Does the embedding, within one’s own website, of another person’s work made 
available to the public on a third-party website, in circumstances such as those in the 
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main proceedings, constitute communication to the public within the meaning of Article 
3(1) of Directive 2001/29 ... insofar as the work concerned is neither directed at a new 
public nor communicated by using specific technical means that differ from that used 
for the initial communication?’ 
3.3.2 Judgement and comments 
The facts in BestWater gave the CJEU the opportunity to discuss embedded linking in 
general. More importantly, there was also an opportunity for the Court to clarify its 
position on the legality of the source content that is being communicated through the 
link. After all, since the original video was still freely accessible on BestWater’s 
website, it could be argued that linking to the allegedly unauthorised YouTube version 
did not communicate the work to a ‘new public’.  
Following its reasoning in Svensson, the Court initially concluded that embedded links 
should be treated the same way as hyperlinks. As long as there was no new public, there 
was no intervention in the public communication right. Hence, the fact that the case 
concerned embedding techniques did not change the Court’s position.56 Consequently, it 
was confirmed that different types of linking techniques are not to be considered 
‘different technical means’. This came as no surprise, as the CJEU previously had 
considered ‘the internet’ as being the common technology for linking activities.  
However, the Court remained ambiguous regarding the legality of the source content, 
seemingly only considering a situation where the linking is directed to lawful source 
content. This author submits the following translation: 
 ‘Indeed, when and as long as the work is freely accessible on the website to which the 
link refers, it must be considered that, when the rightholders have authorised this 
communication, the public taken into account consists of all internet users.’57 
According to some commentators, this passage meant that the Court made a new rule – 
that freely accessible content should generally be assumed to be authorised.
58
 If that is 
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correct, the issue of the legality of the source content would be solved. However, in this 
author’s opinion, the passage is dependent on the fact that the rightholder authorised the 
specific communication to which the link refers. If that is correct, BestWater does not 
provide any new guidance regarding the status of links to unauthorised content. It only 
provides that embedded links are to be treated the same way as hyperlinks. This would 
also explain why the Court decided to hand down its ruling through a fast-track 
‘reasoned order’.  
Therefore, while it is certain that one may embed content from an authorised source as 
long as there is no new public, it remains unclear if this also applies if one links to 
content from an unauthorised third-party source, as long as an authorised version is still 
freely accessible on another website. It is also possible that one can link to a freely 
accessible source in general, regardless of the legality of the source content. The lack of 
clarification is unfortunate, but probably a result of factual uncertainties regarding 
whether the YouTube version of BestWater’s video was authorised or not.59 
Regardless of this, the CJEU’s judgements in Svensson and BestWater both turned on 
the application of the new public criterion. This has garnered a mixed reaction of praise 
and criticism. Hence, in the following chapter, the new public criterion will be 
explained. 
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4 Putting ‘new public’ in 
communication to the public 
4.1 Background 
In this chapter, the concept of ‘new public’ will be put into its legal context. 
Particularly, this means examining Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive, as well as case 
law relating to that provision. Also, it means presenting the international treaties that 
initially introduced the right of communication to the public, and, at a later stage, the 
closely related right of ‘making available’ to the public. 
The copyright holder’s right of communication of the work to the public is not new. In 
1847, French composer Ernest Bourget found success in French courts after he had 
refused to pay his café bill since the café band played his music without consent or 
compensation.
60
 Technological developments have since expanded the public 
communication right, and it is clearly no longer limited to the actual live performance of 
a work. Terrestrial broadcasting of programs and playing sound recordings are acts of 
‘communication’. Providing online streams of videos or sounds recordings, as well as 
uploading literary works, can also be ‘communications’.61 Furthermore, through 
Svensson, it is established that providing a link to a protected work is a 
‘communication’ of that work. 
A public performance or communication right has long been present in international 
copyright treaties, introduced in the Berne Convention and further developed in the two 
WIPO Internet Treaties of 1996, the TRIPS Agreement and several EU directives. 
However, not one of these treaties or directives defines what constitutes an ‘act of 
communication’, or the ‘public’. 
Superficially, the ‘new public criterion’ appears to be a construct of CJEU case law. 
However, it can perhaps be argued that it has support in international treaties and 
guidelines. As the public communication right as such is based on those treaties, it is 
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necessary to investigate its legal context, as well as any possibility that the new public 
criterion may not comply with underlying international treaties. 
4.2 Legal context 
Under international law, the copyright holder’s public communication right stems back 
to the Berne Convention,
62
 entering into force in 1886. The Berne Convention, which 
was subsequently revised in 1896, 1908, 1928, 1948, 1967, 1971, and amended in 1979, 
relates to literary and artistic works – including films – and constitutes the cornerstone 
in copyright law worldwide.
63
 The Berne Convention was complemented by a non-
binding guide in 1978.
64
  In the Berne Convention, a public communication right, 
together with the neighbouring right of public performance, can be found in Article 11, 
11bis, 11ter and Article 14. Hence, the public communication right in the Berne 
Convention is spread out across several articles. This makes its coverage, both 
regarding the subject matter and the form of transmission, incoherent and hard to 
overview.
65
 
For the purposes of this essay, Article 11bis is of particular importance, targeting 
broadcasting, and some neighbouring forms of transmission, of literary and artistic 
works, initially introduced through the Rome Revision in 1928.
66
 However, as the Berne 
Convention was last amended in 1979 it never specifically envisioned communications 
through internet technology and it evidently became clear that a more purposeful 
framework was needed. Nevertheless, Article 11bis has been frequently referred to in 
CJEU case law in relation to the new public criterion. 
As for the EU, the Convention is binding upon Member States as a result of Article 9(1) 
of the TRIPS Agreement, providing that members shall comply with Articles 1 through 
21 of the Berne Convention.
67
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As an effort to adjust copyright protection to the digital age, particularly in order to 
prevent the increasing problem of piracy, two WIPO treaties were adopted in 1996, the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) and the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
(WCT).
68
 The latter introduced ‘making available’ in Article 8, as a sub-category to 
communication to the public. This was considered one of the main achievements of the 
WCT.
69
 Particularly, the introduction of ‘making available’ alongside ‘communication’ 
was meant to catch on-demand technologies as there were concerns that the concept of 
‘communication’ would otherwise be restricted to traditional scheduled broadcasts to 
passive recipients (‘push’ technologies), but not more interactive on-demand services 
such as streaming at the user’s time of choosing (‘pull’ technologies).70 While the Berne 
Convention did not expressly exclude the possibility of members extending the public 
communication right to on-demand transmissions, it was highly uncertain whether the 
provisions put a requirement on members to do so.
71
 Hence, Article 8 of the WCT 
provides: 
‘Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1)(i) and (ii), 
11ter(1)(ii), 14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1) of the Berne Convention, authors of literary and 
artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the 
public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the 
public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access these works 
from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.’ 
Furthermore, in the agreed statements to the WCT, it is said in relation to Article 8:  
‘... the mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication 
does not in itself amount to communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the 
Berne Convention ...’
72
 
This additional declaration was meant to relieve concerns from telecommunications 
organisations and internet service providers. Simply providing the technical 
infrastructure that enables infringing communications should not incur liability.
73
 
                                                 
68
 Bainbridge, p. 269. See also the 15
th
 recital in the preamble to the InfoSoc Directive. 
69
 Tsoutsanis, p. 499; Axham, p. 119-120. 
70
 Mysoor, p. 168. 
71
 Ricketson & Ginsburg, p. 742, 746. 
72
 Agreed Statements concerning Article 8 to the WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996. 
29 
 
The two WIPO treaties were approved in the EU in 2000.
74
 While some of the 
addressed issues had already been covered in previous EU legislation, certain new 
introductions paved the way for the InfoSoc Directive. In the EU, ‘communication to 
the public’ has moreover been introduced in several directives related to copyrights, 
such as the Rental Right Directive,
75
 the Satellite Directive
76
 and the Related Rights 
Directive.
77
 
Here, the focus is on the InfoSoc Directive. Regard should be had to the fact that the 
harmonisation of copyright is based on a high level of protection, being ‘crucial to 
intellectual creation’.78 However, harmonisation should also strive to achieve a fair 
balance between the rights and interests of rightholders and users,
79
 balancing the 
‘fundamental principles of law and especially property, including intellectual property, 
and freedom of expression and the public interest’.80 These two crucial concepts – high 
level of protection and fair balance – must be kept in mind, and will be returned to later 
in this essay. However, the recitals include additional, similarly vague, statements. For 
example, the copyright rules shall respond adequately to ‘economic realities such as 
new forms of exploitation’.81 There is also an overarching goal to foster the production 
and dissemination of creative works.
82
 Contrary to the Berne Convention, Article 3(1) is 
phrased neutrally both regarding the subject matter covered and the form of 
dissemination.  
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4.3 Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive – the concepts of 
‘communication’, ‘making available’ and the ‘public’ 
4.3.1 A two-prong test 
To investigate the relationship between linking, communication to the public and, 
eventually, the meaning of new public, the public communication right contained in 
Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive will now be broken down in smaller parts. As held in 
Svensson, establishing an intervention in the public communication right consists of two 
steps. Firstly, a ‘communication’ must be established. Secondly, that communication 
must be made to a ‘public’.83 As a qualification to this second step, there sometimes has 
to be a communication to a new public. 
The right of communication to the public is a transferable, economic right, as opposed 
to a moral right. Its exploitation by the owner is a potential source of income.
84
 In 
relation to this, Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive expressly states that, unlike the 
owner’s distribution right, the public communication right is not subject to exhaustion 
after its initial exploitation. Each additional act of communication to the public must be 
authorised by the rightholder. This is developed in the recitals, where it is underlined 
that exhaustion should be limited to tangible goods and not to services or online 
services in particular.
85
  
While ‘communication to the public’ is not further defined, it is clear that the meaning 
and scope of the concept should be given an autonomous interpretation throughout the 
EU.
86
 The concept should also, unless a different intention has been expressed, be 
consistent across different directives.
87
 Furthermore, the concept should, as far as 
possible, be interpreted in a consistent manner with international law.
88
  
Considering the fast-changing landscape of the information age, the boundaries of the 
public communication right in the EU have not been entirely certain, though several 
recent CJEU rulings are starting to give clarity. Generally, the communication right has 
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been interpreted broadly in favour of the right holder.
89
 Indeed, this is also expressly 
stated in the 23
rd
 recital in the preamble to the InfoSoc Directive. 
 ‘Making available’ is not a sui generis right, but should rather be considered as a subset 
to, or a specified form of, communication. Consequently, making available expands the 
notion of communication.
90
 Before Svensson, some, including the European Copyright 
Society (ECS), argued that hyperlinking could not be considered an act of 
communication, primarily claiming that ‘transmission’ of a work is a pre-requisite for 
communication.
91
 However, this approach was criticised for not fully investigating the 
concept of making available, which does not necessarily require actual transmission.
92
 
Conveniently, the relationship between ‘communication’ and ‘making available’ can be 
exemplified by the case of linking. 
4.3.2 Something about linking as ‘making available’ 
While this essay mainly purports to discuss the decisive concept of ‘new public’, 
something should be mentioned about the reasons for considering why linking amounts 
to the ‘making available’ of content in the first place. Through Svensson, it is now a fact 
that at least some linking techniques constitute ‘making available’ of the content to 
which it refers. Hence, linking can be an act of communication. The lack of motivation 
behind this conclusion by the CJEU has been criticised and further elaboration would 
have been welcomed. That said, the conclusion that linking can be ‘making available’ is 
not necessarily out of line.  
The ECS, envisioning that the CJEU might conclude that transmission is not necessary 
in order to establish an act of communication, argued that a hyperlink, regardless of 
that, does not communicate a ‘work’ but rather communicates the location of a work.93 
Hence, while a hyperlink sometimes facilitates access to a work, or increases the work’s 
visibility on the web, it could be argued that it does not amount to the ‘making 
available’ of that work. The work is ‘available’ regardless of the hyperlink’s existence, 
until the original communication is taken down or access restricted. 
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So, why is it then that linking amounts to ‘making available’? The CJEU’s succinct 
approach in Svensson can be summed up as follows: 
 An ‘act of communication’ must be construed broadly, in order to assure a ‘high 
level of protection’ for copyright holders. 
 A clickable link offers users direct access to works on another website. 
 It is sufficient that the work is made available to a public that may access it, 
regardless of whether they actually do so. Actual transmission of the work is not 
required.
94
 
Despite this brief motivation, as well as opposition from some commentators, setting 
aside the requirement for actual transmission in order to establish a ‘communication’ of 
a work has support. Indeed, the introduction of ‘making available’, alongside 
‘communication’, was originally meant to cover cases where actual transmission did not 
necessarily take place, but the works were simply offered and made accessible on-
demand.
95
 This position is confirmed by both old
96
 and new
97
 WIPO statements 
concerning the concept of ‘making available’, supporting the notion that it is the 
offering of access that is decisive. Moreover, it was supported by the EU Commission 
Proposal in relation to Article 3(1).
98
 
Therefore, despite the limited motivation in Svensson, it must probably be accepted that 
always requiring actual transmission of a work in order to establish a ‘communication’, 
is outdated in our digital world. Offering access to the work is sufficient. Through 
Svensson, it is also established that a hyperlink generally offers access to a work, and is 
therefore an act of communication. Having said that, the decisive concepts of public and 
new public shall now be investigated.  
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4.3.3 The ‘public’ 
A communication must be made to the ‘public’. As has already been stated, this concept 
has not been defined in the InfoSoc Directive or any underlying treaties. Nonetheless, 
the definition of ‘public’ should be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation 
throughout the Union.
99
 Subsequently, CJEU case law has provided some clarity. 
According to settled case law, the ‘public’ refers to an ‘indeterminate number of 
potential recipients and implies, moreover, a fairly large number of persons’.100 
Emphasis should be put on the wording potential recipients. It is not decisive whether 
the potential recipients actually avail themselves of the opportunity to access the 
content. 
Furthermore, in SGAE, a hotel that provided television services to its customers was 
considered to communicate the programs to a ‘public’ despite the fact that the amount 
of hotel visitors at one single moment was limited. As hotel customers come and go 
quickly, the cumulative effects were considered to amount to an indeterminate and 
fairly large number of people and therefore a communication to the ‘public’.101 Hence, 
the public does not have to be gathered simultaneously. This may be particularly 
relevant in relation to selective websites providing hyperlinks to illicit content. Even if 
such websites only accept a limited amount of users at a time, this could still be seen as 
communications to a ‘public’, considering the cumulative effects. 
This means, if one provides links that are freely accessible for all or many internet 
users, there is no doubt that this is a communication to a ‘public’, as the number of 
potential users is large and indeterminate. This was rightly confirmed in Svensson.  
However, all usage of links cannot reasonably be considered to be communication to a 
‘public’. A hyperlink posted in a private message, from one natural person to another, is 
clearly not communicated to a ‘public’. On the other hand, a hyperlink to copyrighted 
works posted on one’s Twitter ‘feed’, Facebook ‘timeline’, or blog – at least provided 
those pages are accessible to everyone and not restricted to ‘friends’ or ‘followers’ – can 
perhaps be considered communicated to a ‘public’. If the user’s Facebook page (or 
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similar) is ‘friend-locked’, unauthorised communications may still be permissible as the 
work is not communicated to an indeterminate number of recipients.
102
 
As a comparison, in another CJEU reference, Lindqvist v Kammaråklagaren
103
, the 
processing of personal data on a freely accessible website was considered not to benefit 
from the so called ‘household exception’104 as that data had been made accessible to ‘an 
indefinite number of people’.105 This was the case despite the fact that the content on the 
website was only meant to target, and most likely only attract, a limited number of 
visitors. Although the judgement concerned the processing of personal data, it supports 
the argument that the CJEU has adopted an approach of distinguishing public spaces 
from private spaces on the internet, depending on the accessibility and openness of the 
website.  
4.4 The new public 
4.4.1 Background 
The concept that an intervening act of communication – in some circumstances – must 
be directed to a ‘new’ public in order to fall within Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive 
cannot be directly read out from EU legislation or any other international treaties.  
The new public criterion has been developed by the CJEU, but originally seems to stem 
from an extensive interpretation of Article 11bis(1) of the Berne Convention.
106
 While 
not obvious from its wording, that provision may imply that the technological means of 
communication is of relevance when determining the applicability of the new public 
criterion. Indeed, it will emerge that this is the approach taken by the CJEU. Article 
11bis(1) provides: 
‘Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing: 
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(i) the broadcasting of their works or the communication thereof to the public 
by any other means of wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or images;  
(ii) any communication to the public by wire or by rebroadcasting of the 
broadcast of the work, when this communication is made by an organization 
other than the original one; 
(iii) the public communication by loudspeaker or any other analogous instrument 
transmitting, by signs, sounds or images, the broadcast of the work.’ 
Article 11bis(1) therefore envisions three different types of communication to the 
public, type (i), (ii), and (iii), that have subsequently been built upon in the CJEU.
107
 
Consequently, there have been several CJEU cases relating to the concept of new 
public, with reference to Article 11bis(1) of the Berne Convention. At the time of 
Svensson, some commentators speculated that the new public criterion had played its 
part, considering its non-appliance in TVCatchup (see below).
108
 However, a study of 
the cases suggests that the CJEU has, after all, been relatively consistent in its 
application of ‘new public’.  
4.4.2 Cases involving a new public criterion 
4.4.2.1 Case C-306/05 SGAE 
In SGAE, a hotel disseminated broadcasts to the hotel guests by placing televisions in 
their rooms and common areas. The CJEU established that this was an act of 
communication directed to a public. 
The Court then stated, with reference to Article 11bis(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention, 
that the hotel’s actions were to be considered a communication made by a broadcasting 
organisation other than the original one (separate from the original broadcast). Hence, it 
was a type-(ii) communication, directed to a ‘new public’.109 Supported by the Guide to 
the Berne Convention, the CJEU then continued by stating that the rightholder who 
authorised the broadcast of his work (SGAE) envisioned a limited public, typically the 
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owners of reception equipment and their private or family circles. In this case, the hotel 
had communicated the works to a larger audience then the author intended – a new 
section of the public.
110
 Hence, it was through this brief reasoning that the new public 
criterion was created. 
As an endnote, it was also underlined that profit-making is not necessarily a condition 
for establishing an act of communication to the public. Nevertheless, the CJEU pointed 
out that providing television services affected the hotel’s standing and, consequently, 
the price of rooms. Therefore, the communication was of a ‘profit-making nature’.111 
The role of profit-making was thus not clarified.  
4.4.2.3 Joined Cases C-431/09 and C-432/09 Airfield and Canal Digitaal 
SGAE was followed by Airfield and Canal Digitaal.
112
 In the case, which concerned 
communications within the Satellite Directive, encrypted satellite broadcasts of 
television programmes were broadcasted to end users. This prompted rightholders, with 
reference to the Berne Convention, to claim that authorisation was needed.  
While the CJEU did not expressly refer to Article 11bis(1) of the Berne Convention, the 
case is still relevant as the Court expressly strived for a coherent interpretation with the 
InfoSoc Directive.
113
 The broadcasting was considered an additional means of 
broadcasting, expanding the circle of television viewers.
114
 
With reference to SGAE, the rightholder’s authorisation was also considered necessary 
in particular when the re-transmission was directed to a ‘new public’, not taken into 
account by the authors of the protected works.
115
 Interestingly, the Court based this on 
economic considerations, finding support in the 17
th
 recital in the preamble to the 
Satellite Directive. There, it is stated that the rightholder must be ensured appropriate 
remuneration, taking account of both actual and potential recipients.
116
 Such statements 
from the Court imply that the new public criterion is meant to limit the owner’s 
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exploitation of the public communication right after its full economic value has been 
realised. 
4.4.2.4 Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier 
League 
In Football Association Premier League and Others (FAPL), the intervention in the 
rightholder’s public communication right consisted in a pub owner showing satellite 
broadcasts to its customers via television and speakers. 
Generally using the same reasoning as in SGAE, but classifying the intervention as a 
type-(iii) communication,
117
 the CJEU reiterated the need for a broad interpretation of 
the public communication right.
118
 Comparable to SGAE, the pub owner enabled 
customers to enjoy broadcasted works that they would otherwise not be able to enjoy in 
that position.  It was therefore an act of communication to a public.
119
 
In very clear words, it was then held that, in circumstances such as those of the main 
proceedings, the work had to be communicated to a new public. Since the pub owner 
communicated the broadcast to an additional public than the owners of televisions and 
their immediate private circles that was considered, in principle, by the rightholders, the 
works were communicated to a new public.
120
  
Again, the fact that the communication was of a profit-making nature, making the pub 
more attractive to visit, was considered ‘not irrelevant’.121  
Hence, in FAPL, the occurrence of a new public was seemingly firmly established as a 
necessary requirement in establishing a communication to the public. However, this 
immediately created new issues in the following case, TVCatchup. 
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4.4.2.5 Case C-607/11 TVCatchup 
With the CJEU seemingly having established that an intervention in the public 
communication right required re-communication to a ‘new public’, its judgement in 
TVCatchup initially confused commentators. 
Again, the case concerned the interpretation of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive. 
The claimants, ITV Broadcasting and others, were commercial television broadcasters 
of films and programs in the United Kingdom. TVCatchup offered an unauthorised 
internet-based live streaming service of those broadcasts. Importantly, TVCatchup 
asserted that it only allowed access to users who also had legal access to ITV’s 
television broadcasts by virtue of their television licence. Also, the internet streaming 
service could only be used in the United Kingdom.
122
  
In essence, TVCatchup argued that its streaming service did not intervene in ITV’s 
public communication right, since user restrictions meant that the retransmission was 
not communicated to a new public. While this assertion might have seemed to be in line 
with previous case law, the CJEU did not agree. The Courts findings can be summed up 
as follows. 
Initially, the Court ruled, each transmission or retransmission of a work which used a 
specific technical means must be individually authorised by the rightholder of that 
work. Since the streaming service used a specific technical means other than the original 
transmission (internet as opposed to television), there was an act of communication.
123
 
The CJEU supported this new qualification by analogous use of Articles 2 and 8 of the 
Satellite Directive, which required new authorisation where new technologies for 
transmission were used, despite the works being available in the catchment area through 
other technical means.
124
  
Consequently, TVCatchup’s argument that there was no ‘new public’ was dismissed as 
inapplicable. Since the internet streaming service used a specific and different technical 
means (‘the internet’) of transmission than the initial transmission (‘terrestrial 
broadcast’), it was no longer necessary to examine whether a ‘new public’ was reached. 
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This effectively distinguished TVCatchup from SGAE, FAPL, and Airfield and Canal 
Digitaal.
125
 Most interestingly, the CJEU seemed to reach this conclusion with 
reference to Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive relating to the non-exhaustion of the 
public communication right, in addition to the Satellite Directive analogy.
126
  
Finally, the Court yet again remained vague on the role of profit-making in establishing 
a communication.
127
 
4.4.2.6 Comments 
From the case law, it seems that one can conclude that when the retransmission, or re-
communication, uses a different technology than the original communication, the new 
public criterion is dropped. This was introduced in TVCatchup, and later confirmed in 
Svensson. Such re-communications need to be individually authorised. This may be a 
result of the CJEU wanting to uphold the principle of non-exhaustion of the public 
communication right. However, one may question the Court’s blunt position of 
regarding ‘the internet’ as one coherent technology.  
Conversely, when the same technical means is used, the re-communication must be 
directed to a new public, meaning, a public not taken into account by the rightholder 
when authorising the initial communication. This phrasing suggests that the criterion is 
based on the subjective conception of the rightholder.
128
 In practice, in the absence of 
the rightholder expressly having delimited the targeted public, the task of defining what 
public was ‘taken into account’ by the rightholder may be left to the courts. However, in 
SGAE, the CJEU gave some guidance, mentioning that the public taken into account 
should consist of direct users, such as owners of reception equipment and their private 
circle of family and friends, but not new segments of the public such as hotel guests 
(SGAE) or pub guests (FAPL).  
Finally, the role of profit-making in establishing an intervening communication is 
uncertain. While probably not a decisive criterion, the Court’s reiteration of the 
potential relevance of profit-making should at least be noted.  
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4.4.3 Legitimacy of the new public criterion 
4.4.3.1 Defending the new public criterion 
It appears that the existence of the new public criterion is based mainly on Article 
11bis(1) of the Berne Convention, and the 1978 Guide.
129
 In the Guide, it is stated that 
the rightholder, when authorising the communication, only takes account of the direct 
audience receiving the signal within the family circle. Conversely, the rightholder 
cannot be considered to have authorised a retransmission to a wider circle or to an 
additional section of the public. As an example, the Guide mentions the case of 
broadcasting programmes meant for private use in public places. In such scenarios, the 
new public communication requires specific authorisation. Consequently, the 
rightholder should be given control over such new public performances of his work.
130
 
The CJEU did not expressly refer to this specific section in the Guide. However, the 
Advocate-General did, and it is likely that it is this approach, expressed in the Opinion, 
that was eventually adopted by the Court.
131
 
Support for a new public criterion can also be found elsewhere, for example in the 
preparatory works to the Berne Convention, stating that:  
‘...any broadcast aimed at a new circle of listeners, whether by means of a new emission 
over the air or by means of a transmission over wire, must be regarded as a new act of 
broadcasting, and as subject to the author’s specific authorization. ... Consequently, the 
majority (12 votes to six) decided in favour of a Belgian proposal presupposing the 
intervention of a body other than the original one as a condition for the requirement of a 
new authorization.’132 
Furthermore, there is support in a WTO panel report in a dispute between the EU and 
the United States, concerning a section of the United States Copyright Act, providing 
exceptions in the rightholder’s public communication right by allowing communications 
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in certain public places. The section was considered being partly in violation with the 
TRIPS Agreement.
133
 
Consequently, these sources seem to constitute the foundation both for the new public 
criterion as such as well as for it only being applied when a specific technical means is 
used for the retransmission.  
4.4.3.2 Attacking the new public criterion 
The new public criterion has not escaped criticism. In particular, a post-Svensson ALAI 
Opinion expressed criticism to the new public criterion, arguing that it is contrary to 
international agreements, including Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive itself.
134
 This 
criticism is not necessarily unfounded. Firstly, the idea that a communication sometimes 
must be directed to a different public than the one that was originally taken into account, 
simply does not follow from the wording of Article 11bis of the Berne Convention. 
Indeed, that provision only refers to retransmission made by an ‘organisation other than 
the original one’, not to a different or new public.135 
Another criticism has been that the new public criterion is simply based on a misreading 
of the WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention. It is argued that the CJEU has wrongly 
interpreted the wording ‘new public performance’ to mean that a ‘new public’ 
constitutes a necessary requirement. Hence, a potentially more correct interpretation 
would conclude that each new (act of) public communication requires authorisation as 
such, rather than each new public communication.
136
  
Perhaps in particular in relation to internet communications, a strong case can also be 
made that the new public criterion leads to undue exhaustion of the public 
communication right (exhaustion being limited to the distribution of goods). If this is 
the case, it is expressly contrary to Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive. The argument 
is that when a work has been made freely accessible by the rightholder on the web, the 
new public criterion means that anyone can re-communicate it. Hence, the rightholder 
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loses control over the public communication right of the work, which has consequently 
been exhausted.
137
  
The rationale behind exhaustion is that the rightholder should not be entitled to further 
remuneration after realising the full economic value of the content after it has been 
distributed.
138
 It can be argued that the permissive new public criterion, perhaps 
especially in relation to embedded links and framing, which may circumvent 
advertisements and cause confusion regarding the origin of the content, severely 
undermines the possibility for the rightholder to realise this value, whilst at the same 
time potentially creating profits for ‘linkers’. Hence, the public communication right, as 
an exclusive, economic right, is potentially undermined. 
Finally, there is an argument that the application of the new public criterion may, in 
effect, force rightholders to add technical protection measures on their internet 
communications. This can be considered contrary to Article 5(2) of the Berne 
Convention, which states that the enjoyment and exercise of the rights should not be 
subject to any formality.
139
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5 Discussion 
5.1 Introductory remarks and conclusions 
When discussing the new public criterion, two approaches may be taken. Firstly, one 
can discuss its existence as such. Secondly, one can discuss its application. Regarding 
the former, the arguments both for and against the criterion’s existence have already 
been presented. Interestingly, the criticism mainly seems to have surfaced after the 
CJEU’s judgement in Svensson. Arguably, this is a result of the fact that the new public 
criterion’s transfer to internet communications has created different and more 
complicated implications than it did in previous cases. Consequently, it is the 
application that makes for a more interesting discussion.  
Before moving on to the actual analysis, certain conclusions should be reiterated. The 
following seven conclusions are considered relevant for the ensuing discussion: 
 Linking to a copyright protected work amounts to the ‘making available’ of that 
work. Hence, it is an act of communication. 
 The new public criterion is only applied when the re-communication uses the 
same technical means as the initial communication. 
 Communications made through ‘the internet’ are considered using the same 
technical means. Different types of links are thus treated in a neutral manner. 
 The issue of the legality of the source content remains uncertain. However, it is 
certain that one may link to authorised and ‘freely accessible’ source content. 
 What constitutes ‘freely accessible’ content is uncertain, especially regarding the 
status of contractual restrictions in relation to the initial communication.  
 In the case of an authorised and ‘freely accessible’ communication of a work on 
the internet, the rightholder is considered to have taken into account a public 
consisting of ‘all internet users’. 
 The role of profit-making in establishing an intervening communication is 
uncertain, but its relevance should perhaps not be excluded.  
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On the basis of these conclusions, the following analysis ultimately purports to discuss 
two questions regarding the new public criterion, as mentioned in chapter 1 of this 
essay: 
1. What specific issues have arisen as a result of the transfer of the new public 
criterion to internet communications such as links? 
2. Does the new public criterion strike a fair balance between users and 
rightholders in relation to linking activities? 
The questions depend on each other. To a large extent, the answers are dependent on the 
outcome of certain unresolved questions. These will be discussed first. Arguably, one of 
the main issues with the new public criterion’s transfer to internet communications is 
that the rightholder loses control of some unauthorised re-communications. In effect, it 
could be argued that this is comparable to exhaustion of the public communication 
right. Other issues relate to the unclear concept of what constitutes ‘freely accessible’ 
content as well as the legality of the source content.   
It should be borne in mind that linking is an activity performed by both private 
individuals and commercial parties. In the former case, the act of linking is typically an 
innocent, routine act in daily life. In the latter case, linking can be (but not always) an 
intentionally exploitative act with the purpose of earning profits. So far, the CJEU 
seems to have disregarded this difference. 
5.2 Remaining issues 
5.2.1 ‘Freely accessible’ content 
The ultimate status of links to content that is not ‘freely accessible’ might be clarified in 
the still pending C More Entertainment. In that case, the content was behind a paywall 
and therefore arguably not ‘freely accessible’. Thus, the ‘public taken into account’ had 
intentionally been limited to subscribers. Following the reasoning in Svensson, it seems 
likely that such intentional circumvention results in an intervening communication to a 
new public. That conclusion should not be altered by the Court’s ruling in BestWater as 
that case did not concern, or even mention, the status of links which circumvent 
restrictions.  
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In the best of worlds, C More Entertainment would moreover clarify whether the 
concept of ‘freely accessible’ only refers to technical access restrictions, or if 
contractual restrictions also can be considered to affect and limit the ‘public taken into 
account’. It has been argued that the latter is a subjective criterion, which might support 
the idea that even legal restrictions – such as terms of use – on a website could affect 
whether the content is to be considered ‘freely accessible’. But this might create 
undesired implications. Imagine that a website in its terms of use explicitly states that 
embedding of the website’s content is not allowed. If such a statement was relevant in 
delimiting the rightholder’s intended public in relation to Article 3(1), it would put a 
heavy onus on ‘linkers’ to scan the terms of use of every target website. As it seems, 
this requirement would apply to both private individuals and commercial parties. This 
seems like an unreasonable and not necessarily balanced conclusion, intervening in the 
core functioning of web activity.  
Instead, one should remember that the internet allows for easy ways of restricting access 
to content through paywalls or simple log-in requirements. Since the CJEU has 
expressed a desire to offer legal protection for such technical access restrictions, 
rightholders should resort to such solutions, without having to feel that they are self-
enforcing their rights. This result would also lead to desired predictability for all parties 
concerned. Accordingly, in my view, contractual restrictions alone should generally not 
be considered to affect what is to be considered ‘freely accessible’ content. 
5.2.2 Legality of the source content 
The issue of the legality of the source content must also be considered as unresolved. 
Four possible scenarios come to mind:   
First, it has been argued that freely accessible content should be assumed to be coming 
from an authorised source. In that case, one may link to a ‘freely accessible’ source in 
general, regardless of its legality.  
Second, Svensson possibly implies that one can link to an unauthorised reproduction of 
a work, but only so long as an authorised and freely accessible communication is also 
available on the web. However, this interpretation may simply be a result of ambiguous 
wording from the Court (or clumsy interpretation from others).  
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Third, it is also possible that one may not link to an unauthorised reproduction of a work 
in cases where the initial communication took place outside of the internet context. In 
such cases, the re-communication uses a specific technical means from the initial 
communication and it is sufficient that the link is communicated to a ‘public’.  
Finally, it is also possible that one may not link to unauthorised content whatsoever. 
Admittedly, the three latter scenarios would face providers of links with the near-
impossible task of monitoring the legality or free accessibility of authorised content. 
The Court’s indiscriminative approach also seems to imply that it would apply to both 
commercial parties and private individuals. This seems unreasonably complicated.  
Hence, some commentators have suggested that the Court in BestWater provided the 
assumption that freely accessible content is coming from an authorised source. While 
this author is not convinced that this conclusion actually follows from BestWater, it 
would at least clarify the status of links to unauthorised content. However, it would also 
disregard commercial exploitations of copyright protected works by third-parties and 
would, in effect, lead to exhaustion of the public communication right.  
Both Svensson and BestWater dealt with commercial exploitations of works, but the 
Court did not mention the possible idea of requiring profit-making in order to establish 
an intervening communication. However, those cases did not concern linking to 
(established) unauthorised content. While the role of profit-making might have to be 
downplayed considering the vague language in SGAE and FAPL, it could possibly be 
explored further in order to differentiate commercial from non-commercial re-
communications of unauthorised content. That would render profit-seeking re-
communications of unlawful content of works intervening, but not similar re-
communications by private individuals. However, this solution seems unlikely given the 
lack of any such discussion in either Svensson or BestWater. Consequently, the future of 
links to unauthorised source content is hard to predict.  
5.2.3 The issue of exhaustion 
The public communication right shall not be subject to exhaustion. Every new act of 
communication to a public needs to be individually authorised. This principle does not 
prevent private persons from inviting friends and family to take part of the 
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communication (e.g. a television programme or a live stream). In the context of linking, 
it also does not prevent anyone from sending links to someone else in a private 
message. In these cases, there is no ‘public’ and, therefore, no need to investigate any 
occurrence of a ‘new’ public. After Svensson and BestWater, it may be going too far to 
constitute that the public communication right is fully exhausted in relation to internet 
communications. Rather, in some cases, something that may be referred to as ‘semi-
exhaustion’ arises. 
In the early cases where the new public criterion was introduced, such as SGAE and 
FAPL, the Court dealt with terrestrial broadcasts. In those cases, the re-communications 
had a commercial significance. The Court considered the communications, by the hotel 
and pub respectively, to be directed to a wider audience than the one that the rightholder 
could have reasonably taken into account when authorising the initial communication. 
Consequently, there were new public communications. In such cases, it was likely that 
most re-transmissions would either reach a ‘new’ public, or no ‘public’ at all. The 
concepts of ‘public’ and ‘new public’ were close knit.  
The exception was TVCatchup. Again, commercial considerations arguably lay behind 
the Court’s decision to drop the new public criterion. As there was no new public, a 
strict application of the new public criterion would have threatened the financial 
position of the rightholders. By limiting the application of the new public criterion to 
situations where the same technical means is used, the Court effectively managed to 
evade the new public criterion, thereby protecting the interests of rightholders. Hence, 
since the full economic value had not been realised, the public communication right was 
left intact, and the principle of non-exhaustion was not compromised. 
However, by upholding the new public criterion and the specific technical means-
doctrine that protected the rightholders in TVCatchup, particular issues arise in relation 
to linking. In fact, it can be argued that the new public criterion leads to undue 
exhaustion despite the fact that the full economic value may not have been realised. 
For example, commercial websites can now provide embedded links to (authorised) 
content that is ‘freely accessible’ on another website, without communicating the works 
to a new public. This means that many users will never need to take part of the initial, 
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authorised communication. Hence, the full economic value of the rightholder is not 
always realised. Instead, the rightholder may either restrict access to content, but will 
then risk losing desired traffic, or choose to let the content remain freely accessible, but 
that will entail exhaustion of that content and loss of profits. However, the rightholder is 
still ultimately in control since removing or restricting access to the work probably also 
renders unauthorised communications of that work illicit. Hence, the exhaustion is 
merely ‘temporary’. 
Also, while Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive clearly states that the public 
communication right shall not be exhausted, it can be argued that the new public 
criterion is not contrary to that provision, as the criterion inevitably has altered the 
scope of the public communication right. Again, Article 3(3) provides: 
‘The rights referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be exhausted by any act of 
communication to the public or making available to the public as set out in this 
Article.’140 
However, when the new public criterion is applicable, the right in paragraphs 1 and 2 
have been limited. In such cases, the rightholder simply does not have the right to 
authorise or prohibit re-communications of the work that do not reach a new public. 
While the CJEU does not explicitly support this approach, it is clear from TVCatchup 
that the Court has at least not forgotten about the non-exhaustion rule. Rather, it seems 
that the principle of non-exhaustion of the public communication right has been 
qualified as well. The rightholder retains the right to prohibit and authorise re-
communications to a new public, and that right is not exhausted. This conclusion does 
not fully answer whether or not the new public criterion has transferred well to internet 
communications. This author simply considers that its application is not necessarily 
contrary to Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive.  
5.3 A balanced future? 
Having made the effort to provide answers to some key questions regarding the new 
public criterion in relation to linking and internet communications, this essay will now 
conclude in an attempt to provide answers to the questions set out earlier in this chapter. 
                                                 
140
 Italics added. 
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Unfortunately, the answers must partly be left pending awaiting certain clarifications. 
This in itself may suggest that the new public criterion has not transferred smoothly to 
internet communications, considering the significant amount of criticism and 
unresolved issues. However, it does seem that the Court has not been oblivious to the 
status of linking as a core function of the web, which has required a dynamic approach 
to certain concepts. Despite reiterating the need for a high level of protection for 
rightholders, it seems that the boundaries of the new public criterion, in relation to 
internet communications, may be much more decisive than before. For example, the 
notion of the ‘public taken into account’ is evidently a dynamic concept. In relation to 
terrestrial broadcasts, the intended public is narrow, relating to owners of reception 
equipment and their private circles. However, in relation to internet communications, 
the intended public is widened, consisting of all internet users who could have accessed 
the content. Hence, the new public criterion proves to be a dynamic concept. 
The Court clearly realised the importance of maintaining the ability to link to content 
and has adjusted key concepts of the new public criterion accordingly. It rather seems 
that the Court has adopted a purposeful and pragmatic approach, respecting the 
importance of links as a form of dissemination but also the need for rightholders to 
protect their content (through access restrictions). This could be considered as an effort 
to strike a fair balance. However, there is an argument that unshackled commercial 
exploitations of the content of rightholders may force them to impose technical access 
restrictions, or accept a ‘semi-exhausted’ public communication right. Accordingly, the 
Court’s priority seems to be to maintain the normal functioning of the web, rather than 
ensuring a high level of protection.  
However, there are unsolved questions. The Court has been unwilling to put its foot 
down regarding the legality of the source content. In this author’s view, some leeway 
must at least be granted to private individuals who link to unauthorised content. Too 
strict of an approach would certainly ensure a high level of protection for rightholders, 
but would hardly strike a fair balance. One solution could be to return to the unclear role 
of profit-making in establishing an intervening public communication. After all, for 
most private individuals, linking is a mundane activity without regard to the legality of 
the source content. On the contrary, commercial websites that systematically provide 
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links to illicit content may have to be treated differently. However, additional 
qualifications to the already controversial new public criterion may not be received 
warmly. Unfortunately, C More Entertainment does not concern unauthorised content 
and is unlikely to provide clarifications in that regard. 
At this stage, it can simply be concluded that a cautious CJEU still has work to do in 
relation to the legal status of linking activities and the public communication right. So 
far, the Court has been very pragmatic, perhaps somewhat favouring users before 
rightholders so as not to ‘break the internet’. However, the unwillingness of the Court to 
make up its mind on key questions suggests that it may still be some time before the 
issue of linking in relation to the public communication right is ultimately resolved. 
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